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1. INTRODUCTION
It is gratifying that the Texas International Law Journal has published Preliminary
Draft No. 1 of the American Law Institute project on Transnational Rules of Civil
Procedure, together with commentaries by civil procedure experts from various parts of the
world. This symposium continues a discussion of a legal problem that must be confronted
in the years ahead, namely that of international "harmonization" of the rules governing
judicial resolution of civil disputes, particularly those arising from international trade and
finance.
This essay describes the genesis of the Transnational Rules project, the present stage
of the drafting and deliberation process, and some of the basic problems that must be
addressed in such a set of rules. In addressing these matters, I refer to "we." That term
includes my colleague and co-reporter, Professor Michele Taruffo of the University of
Pavia, Italy. More generally, the term "we" includes the American Law Institute, which
has approved the project and is sponsoring its pursuit. Still more generally, the term
includes the national and international advisers to that project and all those concerned with
the international legal order-lawyers, judges, and legal academicians-who recognize the
importance of the law of procedure in the agenda of harmonization of legal systems.
II. GENESIS OF THE PROJECT
The immediate initiative for the ALI project in Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure
was a professional collaboration between Professor Taruffo and me that has now continued
for more than a decade. At the inception of our collaboration Professor Taruffo had already
t Director, American Law Institute; Trustee Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. I express
appreciation to Dr. Antonio Gidi for assistance in the project and in preparation of this article.
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become recognized as a leading thinker and author in the field of comparative civil
procedure Professor Taruffo was a student and professional prot~g6 of Professor Vittorio
Dente, his predecessor in the Chair of Comparative Civil Procedure at the University of
Pavia and a pioneer in the field of comparative procedural law. He has also done important
2scholarship in comparative jurisprudence. I had broad experience in U.S. civil procedure
and related subjects, 3 but limited acquaintance with foreign law. However, at Yale and
other domestic law schools I had worked with several foreign students engaged in LL.M.
and other graduate legal studies, and I have taught Comparative Civil Procedure at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
The collaboration with Professor Taruffo began with my giving lectures in Pavia (in
English) concerning certain fundamental legal concepts in U.S. civil procedure that we
thought would be of interest in comparative analysis. A number of these lectures have been
translated and published in Italian journals.4 The collaboration has continued with
Professor Taruffo's visits to this country at Yale, Cornell, and Pennsylvania. It culminated
in a book we wrote together on American civil procedure, which was published in Italian
for a European audience, in English in this country (slightly revised), and in Japanese.
5
These endeavors have been deeply interesting in themselves and have led us to think that
perhaps there was more in common among procedural systems than had been generally
supposed.
In this connection it is relevant to observe that both Professor Taruffo and I are
strongly appreciative of law practice as well as legal theory. Both he and I, for example,
practice law on the side as well as carrying forward our academic pursuits. We also
noticed, what is an obvious fact, that law practitioners all over the world are handling
international civil legal disputes. To be sure, these disputes are now adjudicated in national
1. MICHELE TARUFFO, STUDI SULLA RILEVANZA DELLE PROVE (1970); MICHELE TARUFFO, LA
MOTIVAZIONE DELLA SENTENZA CIVILE (1975); MICHELE TARUFFO, IL PROCESSO CIVILE ADVERSARY
NELL'ESPERIENZA AMERICANA (1979); MICHELE TARUFFO, LA GIUSTIZIA CIVILE IN ITALIA DAL'700 A OGGI
(1980); MICHELE TARUFFO, IL VERTICE AMBIGUO: SAGGI SULLA CASSAZIONE CIVILE (1991); MICHELE TARUFFO,
LA PROVA DEI FATTI GIURIDICI: NOZIONE GENERALI (1992); MICHELE TARUFFO & S. BRAVO, LE RIFORIE DELLA
GIUSTIZIA CIVILE (1993); LUIGI PAOLO COMOGLIO ET AL., LEZIONI SUL PROCESSO CIVILE (1995); FEDERICO CARPI
ET AL., COMMENTARIO BREVE AL CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE (3a ed. 1994); Michele Taruffo, I limirl
soggettivi del giudicato e le "class actions," 24 RdISTA DI DIRITrO PROCESUALE [RiV. DIR. PROC.] 609 (1969);
Michele Taruffo, "Collateral estoppel" e giudicato sulle questioni (), 26 RIV. DIR. PROC. 651 (1971); Michele
Taruffo, "Collateral estoppel" e giudicato sulle questioni (1), 27 Riv. DIR. PROC. 272 (1972); Michele Taruffo,
Le prove scientiviche nella recente esperienza statunitense, 50 RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRRITO E PROCEDURA
CIVILE [RIV. TRIM. DIR. PROC. Civ.] 219 (1996).
2. MICHELE TARUFFO, GIURISPRUDENZA, Enc. sc. Soc. treccani, IV, 348; Robert S. Summers & Michele
Taruffo, Interpretation and Comparative Analysis, in INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 461 (D.
Neil MaeCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991); Michele Taruffo & Massimo La Terre, Precedent in Italy,
in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 141 (D. Neil MaeCormick & Robert S. Summers eds.,
1997).
3. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE, STATE AND
FEDERAL (7th ed. 1994); FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 1992); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,
JR. & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING (2d ed. 1990); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS (1982).
4. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Per un approccio manageriale al problema dei ritardi nell'ammntnistrazlone
della giustizia, 43 RIV. TRIM. DIR. PROC. CIV. 961, 961-74 (1989); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Azioni dl
responsabilitii verso gli amministratori di socielb commerciali nel diritto statunitense, RIVISTA SOCIETA [RIV.
SOCIETA] 441 (1994); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., Perch6 agli avvocati dovrebbe essere consentito I'uso della
publicitt, 32 RIVISTA DI DIRTTo CIVILE [RIV. DIR. CIV.] 277 (1986).
5. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & MICHELE TARUFFO, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE: AN INTRODUCTION
(1993); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & MICHELE TARUFFO, LA GIUSTIZIA CIVILE NEGLI STATI UNITI (1993);
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & MICHELE TARUFFO, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE (translated by
Makito Tanabe with the supervision of Professor Yasuhei Taniguchi) (1997).
[VOL. 33:489
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courts according to local national procedures with all their local differences. Moreover,
disputes arising from international transactions are increasingly adjudicated in arbitration
6
according to procedures having general similarity. However, representing clients in
international legal disputes requires that practitioners conducting the litigation be able to
explain procedural problems in terms intelligible at least to the lawyers representing those
clients back home. This in turn implies that, at some level of specificity, matters of
procedure therefore were more or less mutually intelligible. In addition, we both had the
suspicion that legal scholarship, in its natural and necessary orientation, emphasizes
differences-often subtle ones-rather than commonalties among procedural systems.
These observations led us to the conviction that a project for transnational civil procedure
was feasible as a matter of basic concepts, even if it might be very difficult as a matter of
expression among different legal and cultural backgrounds and even more difficult as a
matter of eventual implementation.
Another inspiration was the Model Code of Civil Procedure for Iberoamerica.7 The
success of that project is reflected not only in the fact that Uruguay adopted it as the
national code of civil procedure, but also that some other countries adopted or are
considering adoption of some provisions from that Model Code.
8
Another source of inspiration was the project for approximation of procedural law
within the European Community, which had proceeded under the direction of Professor
Storme of Belgium.9 The report of this project is becoming a standard reference in the
comparative study of civil procedure. Professor Taruffo and I, in a further revision, plan to
adopt a number of the formulations in that project, notwithstanding that it was based in a
somewhat limited sphere-the laws of only the twelve members of the European
Community-whereas ours contemplates application worldwide. At the level of general
principle, in any event, there is strong encouragement in Professor Storme's reflection upon
his project:
In the debates on the unification of procedural law, the same question always
arises: Continental v. Common Law? Not only do I find, when it comes down
to the "nitty-gritty," that the distinction between the two legal families is less
than is believed, but also, as my experience in our working-group showed, that
in the final analysis the differences are more of a formal and/or terminological
nature.10
6. The problem with arbitration procedure in international disputes is itself worthy of further attention. The
international conventions and contract provisions for arbitration in international legal disputes primarily address
jurisdiction, arbitral authority, and recognition of arbitral awards. Generally, these provisions leave to the
arbitrator the question of procedural detail. Understandably, the result is that arbitration procedure tends to be
determined by the nationality of the arbitrators, particularly the neutral arbitrator in a multi-person panel. The
ALI Transnational Rules project accordingly has a parallel project on rules of procedure in international
arbitration. See AMERICAN LAW INsTITUTE, Transnational Rules for Arbitration, Preliminary Draft No. IA (Apr.
I, 1998) (unpublished ALI document, on file with the Texas International Law Journal).
7. Anteproyecto del Codigo Procesal Civil Modelo para Iberoamerica, 52 REVISTA DE PROCESSO [REV.
PROC.J 134, reprinted in UN CODICETIPO DI PROCEDURA CIVILE PER L'AMERICA LATINA 517-609 (1990).
8. Cf E. Vescovi, Nuevas Tendencias del Derecho Procesal Civil, corn Especial Referencia al Proceso
latino-Americano, 79 REV. PROC. 20 (1995).
9. APPROXIMATION OF JUDICIARY LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Marcel Storme ed., 1994). Professor
Marcel Storme is currently the president of the International Association of Procedural Law.
10. Id. at 55.
1998]
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In this connection I must report observations that Professor Taruffo and I have made
from the perspective we have assumed in undertaking the Transnational Rules project. As
we have labored to establish mutual comprehension, we have repeatedly encountered two
phenomena. First, there is no single civil-law model of civil procedure, nor any single
common-law model. For example, the German and English systems (one being a civil-law
system and the other a common-law one) have conspicuous resemblances to each other that
contrast with differences of both from the French and Italian systems. Second, and
correlatively, all systems have basic similarities, for example, in the need for both pleadings
and proof-taking and for an appropriate balance between the roles of judges and advocates.
In this connection it should be observed that the distinction between the "adversary" system
(common law) and the "inquisitorial" system (civil law) is generally exaggerated and
misleading. Indeed, in certain respects the role of advocates in some civil-law systems is
far more "adversarial" than in common-law systems. Litigation in common-law systems is
primarily propelled by the activity of advocates, which in turn requires their cooperation,
however intense the friction may be through which cooperation is effected. In contrast, in
most civil-law systems the litigation is propelled by activity of the judge after the pleading
stage. In such systems cooperation between advocates along the lines of common-law
procedure is simply unnecessary and therefore is uncommon.
Still another moving force in undertaking our project was the positive development in
another ALI project, the Transnational Insolvency Project under the direction of Professor
Jay Westbrook of The University of Texas." Professor Taruffo and I were well aware of
the complexities of harmonizing the law of insolvency. If harmonization in the
complicated and culturally sensitive subject of bankruptcy could be achieved, we imagined
that it could also be done in the law of civil procedure.
Finally, we were inspired by more general calls for harmonization or unification of
law across international boundaries. Nevertheless, Professor Taruffo and I are fully aware
of the difficulties involved in this endeavor. Many of the difficulties are presented in the
thoughtful papers contributed to this symposium, and there are others as well. The
procedural system that is most aberrant-i.e., most distinctive compared with the civil
procedure systems of modem nations in general-is the system that applies in U.S. trial
courts of general jurisdiction. For this reason, the problem of harmonization of civil
procedure can be considered to be primarily a U.S. problem. The task is to devise
procedural rules acceptable in this country, for some types of international litigation, that
will be substantially compatible with the procedural systems of most of the rest of the
world.
III. THE APPROACH
Professor Taruffo and I have adopted a direct approach to devising such a system of
procedural rules. We have begun by drafting a code that addresses comprehensively the
problems that all procedural systems must face. These include the problems of personal
jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction, venue, issue formulation (pleading), preliminary
procedures, plenary hearing including rules of evidence, appellate review, and subsequent
enforcement or attack on a judgment. It will be observed that, with reference to these
problems, our Draft often refers "outward" to the rules of the national legal system in which
the Rules supposedly have been adopted and are being applied. This is a matter of
convenience as well as necessity. This is consistent with Kerameus's observation that
11. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Transnational Insolvency Project, International Statement of U.S.
Bankruptcy Law (Tentative Draft, Apr. 15, 1997).
[VOL. 33:489
HeinOnline  -- 33 Tex. Int'l L. J. 492 1998
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE ALI TRANSNATIONAL RULES
"international procedural unification can only be partial."' 2 The basic point, however, is
that we have brought within view the full scope of procedural problems, running from
jurisdiction to judgments, and not merely a subset of these problems.
This "comprehensive" approach requires confrontation of all possibilities of
difference and conflict among various procedural systems. That confrontation is
advantageous from an intellectual point of view and in long-term perspective. The
problems of difference exist and cannot be disregarded. All projects in the harmonization
of the subject of civil procedure, even those addressing aspects of limited scope, must deal
with these differences.
A notable example is the intense conflict over discovery, particularly discovery of
documents that ensued after The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters. In retrospect it appears that there may have been inadequate
appreciation in the drafting stage of the difference between the law of most countries,
particularly civil law systems, and the law and practice of the United States. 13 A similar set
of issues is presented in The Hague Conference project on jurisdiction and recognition of
judgments, for which Professor Kessedjian, contributor to this special issue and one of our
international advisers, is the Rapporteur: How does the international legal community deal
with the fact that the present rules concerning assertion of personal jurisdiction differ
substantially from one legal system to another?14 The precise terms for resolving such
questions are difficult and contentious. The point is that, in an endeavor at international
harmonization of law, all such problems must sooner or later be addressed.
The comprehensive approach, however, is disadvantageous strategically and in the
shorter term. It opens the project to a wide range of criticism on all possible grounds, a
good many of which are advanced by the contributors to this symposium. The
comprehensive approach also reveals how difficult it will be to obtain acceptance of the
proposal, or even its serious consideration, at the law-making stage of the political process.
In drafting these Rules, we found problems of language and terminology in addition
to differences in the systems of civil procedure. It is very difficult to find terminology that
would be equally understood and applied by the courts in England and Brazil, in Canada
and Germany. This problem was also felt in the attempt of Approximation of Judiciary
Law in the European Community, which dealt with a more limited group of countries (the
twelve members of the European Community). As noted by its reporter, Professor Storme,
"divergent procedures conceal themselves under the same name" and "similar institutes,
serving similar purposes, conceal themselves under different names."'
15
These problems of system and terminology converge into problems of procedural
ethos-underlying fundamental concepts concerning the very nature of the administration
of justice. Differences in these fundamental concepts are related in the challenging paper
written by Professor Walter and Mr. Baumgartner. 16 Addressing these concepts and themanifest and subtle differences among them are a necessary ingredient of this project.
12. Konstantinos D. Kerameus, Procedural Unification: The Need and the Limitations, in INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL JUSTICE 54 (I.R. Scott ed., 1990).
13. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law Jurisdictions, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1017, 1017-20 (1998).
14. See generally CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN, INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN
CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS (1997). Professor Kessedjian, one of the contributors to this symposium, is
the principal Rapporteur for that important project.
15. APPROXIMATION OF JUDICIARY LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 9, at 56.
16. Gerhard Walter & Samuel P. Baumgartner, Utility and Feasibility of Transnational Rules of Civil
Procedure: Some German and Swiss Reactions to the Hazard-Taruffo Project, 33 TEx. INT'L L.J. 463 (1998).
1998]
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However, concerning the issue of comprehensiveness, Professor Taruffo and I are
encouraged by the example of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the United States.
The Rules were promulgated in 1938 after a half-century of controversy over whether a
uniform set of rules for the federal courts was preferable--or even possible-in
displacement of the previous regime of "conformity" of federal procedure to the procedural
law of the several states.
17
IV. LIMITED SCOPE
The Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure undertake comprehensiveness in terms of
"horizontal" scope, as indicated above, by addressing international litigation from inception
to conclusion. However, the Rules are not comprehensive in "vertical" scope-they do not
apply to all types of civil controversies, but only to a limited set. The precise definition of
the set for inclusion remains to be worked out. Our definition in the present draft is in
terms of the identity of the parties: An international legal dispute is one in which the parties
are different nationals.' 8 In this respect, the project is quite different from that undertaken
by Professor Storme's European harmonization project. The scope of that project included
all domestic as well as international civil cases in the trial courts of general jurisdiction of
the European civil-law systems.
In this respect it is perhaps useful to address the criticism that special rules of
procedure for international transactions would introduce multiplicity-"another set of
rules"--and discrimination.' 9 This is certainly a consideration to be taken into account.
However, the ultimate premise of this criticism must be that a proper legal system should
have one set of procedural rules for civil disputes. Yet the fact is that no modem legal
system has a single set of procedures for adjudicating civil controversies.
To be sure, most legal systems have one basic code of civil procedure governing
adjudication in their trial courts of general jurisdiction. Nevertheless, even these systems
have variations or subsystems for certain types of litigation, for example litigation
concerning family affairs.20 Practically all legal systems also have different sets of rules for
adjudications in specialized courts, for example labor courts or tribunals administering
claims for social benefits. In the United States, with our federal legal system, we have long
been accustomed to two coexistent legal systems, state and federal, within each of which
there are several procedural subsystems. Thus, in the federal courts there are distinct
Bankruptcy Rules and Admiralty Rules, to say nothing of the procedures in various
administrative agencies, and there are similar multiple procedural systems in the states.
Perhaps it can be said that from the viewpoint ofjudges, there is only one procedural law in
typical legal systems. The typical judge, whether in a civil court or a labor court, must
administer only one set of rules. From the viewpoint of the clients and their legal advisers,
however, the situation is very different. The parties to legal disputes realize that their
affairs have been regulated by multiple bodies of substantive law and will be adjudicated
according to multiple procedural regimes. In an international transaction today, the
prospect of such legal multiplicity is of course increased.
17. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1001-08
(2d ed. 1987).
18. This definition will probably be changed to refer to "habitual residence" rather than nationality, in
accordance with growing usage of the former concept.
19. See generally Gary B. Born, Critical Observations on the Draft Transnational Rules of Civil
Procedure, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 387 (1998).
20. See, e.g., §§ 606-20 Zivilprocel3ordnung [ZPO] (1994).
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At all events, the ALI Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure are addressed, not to
civil litigation generally, but to a limited number of controversies whose characteristic is
that they arise in an international transaction. The precise definition of that limited scope is
itself an important and difficult matter.
V. VIEWS OF THE PROJECT
Any such project, if it has substantial content, will attract conflicting views. Some of
those views are expressed herein. Other critical views have been expressed in other forums
and in the advisory meetings that are integral to ALI projects.I
We have already presented this project in forums across the world. In those
presentations, we received contributions from scholars and practitioners from diverse
backgrounds. Many of these contributions have already been incorporated in revisions we
have done thus far.
Professor Taruffo and I appreciate those criticisms because they advance points and
considerations that we had not considered or had not adequately considered. At the same
time, we assure readers and colleagues that we have given at least preliminary
consideration to most of the criticisms we have heard, and to many others whose
significance may lie undetected beneath phrases in our formulations. Let me briefly review
some of the principal criticisms, if only to indicate that Professor Taruffo and I have sought
to listen carefully.
A first criticism is that there is no need for such a new set of rules.22 Every country
has a satisfactorily established legal system with its own rules, and moreover, arbitration
pursuant to agreement is ubiquitously employed.
However, it is not true that every country has a system of civil procedure that it finds
satisfactory. Many countries have been or are presently engaged in revisions, some of them
substantial, of their domestic rules of civil procedure. Notable examples are the extensive
reforms recently adopted in the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure23 and those proposed in
the Woolf Report in England,24 which are now being implemented. There are similar
reform efforts underway in Italy and Spain. There are recent and pending revisions of
important civil rules in this country, notably those concerning discovery and class actions.
25
Moreover, there is tension, if not contradiction, between the proposition that the
world's present civil procedure systems are satisfactory and the proposition that arbitration
is ubiquitously employed: if the national legal systems were fully satisfactory, then
arbitration would not be so ubiquitous. More fundamentally, all legal systems strive to
reduce the risk that the outcome of an adjudication can depend merely on the forum in
which it is adjudicated. Ameliorating that risk is the very purpose of private international
law, choice of law as it is also called. One way of ameliorating that risk is through rules of
21. Every ALl project involves drafting cycles including a preliminary draft reviewed by Advisers, a
revision presented to the ALI Council, and a further revision presented to the Institute's annual meeting. Most
ALL projects, including this one, proceed through such a drafting cycle more than once. For the Transnational
Rules project, advisers have been designated from around the world and from all major legal systems.
22. See Russell J. Weintraub, Critique of the Hazard-Taruffo Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure, 33
TEx. INT'L L.J. 413 (1998).
23. Code of Civil Procedure, in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN (MB), Statute Vol. II, Law No. 109 (1996).
24. LORD WOOLF OF BARNES, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL
JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1996).
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 23, 26.
1998]
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private international law, issues which Professors Dolinger and Tiburcio and Professor
26Weintraub address herein. It is clear that rules of private international law are essential in
a social system constituted from more than one political regime. Since our world consists
of multiple political regimes, and certainly will in the future, private international law
remains essential.
However, another way of ameliorating the risk of different outcomes being dependent
on forum is adoption of legal rules that transcend the limits of the multiple political
regimes. That is precisely the character of international law-legal rules that govern in
every nation. From time immemorial, there have been rules of international law, primarily
in the areas of commercial contracts and proto-admiralty law. The practical pressures for
enlarging the scope of international law are increasing everywhere and every day; witness
the important project of The Hague Conference on Private International Law. 7 The
continuing need for such rules is as clear as the need for private international law. The
world legal order of the past and certainly the world legal order of the future will continue
to require both international law and choice of law rules which reference the local law of
various states.
The difficult question, therefore, concerns the specific subject matter that might be
governed by choice of law and that which ought to be governed by uniform international
law. The valuable analyses by Professors Dolinger, Tiburcio, and Weintraub suggest that
the present draft of the Transnational Rules does not take adequate account of the range of
issues concerning which local law should apply, guided by selection criteria in the rules of
28private international law.
A second criticism is that, to the extent that there is need for uniformity across
national borders, the need is greatest in matters of substantive law, for example in
commercial law. Hence, a project for uniform rules of procedure is in any event premature.
Undoubtedly the need for international uniformity is greatest in commercial law and
many centers are working diligently to meet that need. Nevertheless, there is good reason
to address procedural law. Procedure makes a difference. Some would say all the
difference in the world. As noted above, it is a fundamental deficiency of a world legal
order that the outcome of legal disputes can be substantially different depending on the
forum, notwithstanding that the same substantive law is applied. The justification for the
project for Approximation of Judiciary Law in the European Community was that the lack
of uniformity of procedural rules causes "distortion of free competition and alteration of the
trade flow.
29
Of course, legal realists recognize that a critical variable in adjudication is the
mentality and competence of individual judges and that this variable is largely beyond
control through legal rules. However, reduction of differences in procedural systems must
be an objective of all who are seriously interested in the concept of equality before the law.
That being so, and if it is accepted that procedure makes a difference, the law of procedure
must be on the agenda for harmonization.
At the same time, it must be recognized that procedural law presents the most difficult
challenge to efforts at world uniformity. No other body of law so deeply reflects a nation's
26. See Jacob Dolinger & Carmen Tibureio, The Forum Law Rule in International Litigation-Which
Procedural Law Governs Proceedings to be Performed in Foreign Jurisdictions: Lex Fori or Lex Diligentiae?,
33 TEx. INT'L L.J. 425 (1998); Weintraub, supra note 22.
27. CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN, supra note 14.
28. See Dolinger & Tiburcio, supra note 26; Weintraub, supra note 22.
29. See Constantinos D. Kerameus, supra note 12, at 50; see also APPROXIMATION OF JUDICIARY LAW IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 9, at 46, 59, and 69-70.
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social and cultural traditions or is so deeply embedded in its constitutional and political
structures. Concerning the law of procedure, in some sense law is "politics" in the
30comprehensive connotation of that term. On the other hand, for those very reasons,
addressing the law of procedure is a means of probing deepest presuppositions in the legal
systems of the world's various regimes.
In more parochial terms, a justification for a project on procedure in the present time
is that harmonization of procedure is so complicated and generally takes so long. Those of
us in this country should recall that reform of common-law procedure took almost a century
between the time that Blackstone expounded the deficiencies of the common law and
adoption of the Field Code in New York and that the project culminating in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure required another half century. The unfortunate termination of
Professor Storme's admirable project for harmonization of procedure within the civil law
systems of Europe is another reminder.
A third criticism is that a new set of rules will result in discrimination among litigants.
More specifically, if the proposed rules or something like them were adopted in the United
States, the discrimination will be adverse to smaller U.S. businesses. This is the thesis
presented in the paper by Gary Born in this symposium.3 1 Again, there is force to the point,
but there are also competing considerations.
Mr. Born is undoubtedly correct that some smaller businesses would be disadvantaged
in specific legal controversies by the rules proposed in the draft Transnational Rules of
Civil Procedure compared with the rules that ordinarily govern civil litigation in this
country. He cites as advantageous to small businesses the availability of jury trial, broad
discovery, and the "American" cost-rule under which the winner does not receive
attorney's fees. However, it is also the case that smaller businesses would be distinctly
advantaged by the proposed rules. Jury trial probably is ordinarily favorable in a contest
between a small business and a large one, but not so in a contest between a small business
and an individual or between businesses that are both small. Jury trial is in any event
ordinarily more costly than nonjury trial, and other things being equal, a small business has
less financial staying power than a big one. Broad discovery may be advantageous in some
cases against big companies, but it can also be ruinously expensive for a small business.
And the "American" rule concerning costs is a deterrent against a litigant who has a good
claim on the merits but weaker financial resources than the opponent. It can be asked, if
the present U.S. procedural regime is so balanced against big businesses, how can we
explain the litigation strategy of the tobacco companies against claims of lung cancer
victims?
More generally, one cannot predict with any degree of confidence the incentive
effects of changes in rules of procedure, particularly a package of interacting changes such
as set forth in the draft Transnational Rules. The changes may or may not relocate the
fulcrum of the incentive structure for any given type of litigation. In any event, I venture to
say that most observers outside the United States would think that the litigating incentive
structure in the Transnational Rules, so far as it can be estimated, is "fairer" than that
afforded under the prevailing U.S. version.
30. For one statement recognizing this characteristic of the law of procedure, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Harmonization of Procedural Law, 44 J. Civ. PROC. 70 (1997).
31. See Born, supra note 19.
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VI. CONCLUSION: A "FAIR" SYSTEM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE?
The fundamental issue posed by the Transnational Rules project is, in my view,
whether it is possible to converse across national borders, in different languages based on
different cultural traditions, about "fairness" in adjudication of civil disputes.
It is certainly possible to converse about the concept of fairness as an abstract
proposition. It is possible to make comparisons of sorts between specific rules, such as the
discovery rules or the rule governing litigation costs. It is much more difficult to address
the concept in concrete terms for an entire procedural code. However, such a conversation
is a necessary predicate for eventual harmonization of procedural systems. Conversation
about procedural advantage and disadvantage is the essence of comparative law, a
discipline that can be applied to procedure as well as to substantive law.
In this connection it is useful to reflect on implications of the "explosion" in
constitutional law since World War II. The concept of constitutional guarantees is, in
essence, legal rules that supersede the provisions of administrative regulation and
legislation and that are enforceable through judicial proceedings. This concept is becoming
a norm recognized worldwide. A familiar example is the European Court. Salient among
constitutional guarantees is that of "due process" or freedom from "arbitrary" decisions:
Call the concept simply procedural fairness. That concept must be given content in the
course of the new constitutional jurisprudence. It is a historical fact of the U.S. legal
experience that the technical content of our Due Process Clause has substantially derived
from previously established rules of ordinary criminal and civil procedure evolved in our
courts. A similar parallel development between constitutional concept and procedural code
specification can be anticipated at the transnational level.
Conversation about procedural advantage and disadvantage is also part of the
professional lore of every lawyer consulted about a controversy that could be adjudicated in
more than one forum-whether the choice may lie between state and federal court in this
country or between litigation here and litigation in another country. The range of that
professional lore has necessarily expanded to become global as trade and commerce have
become global. It is much appreciated that the Texas International Law Journal has
afforded this opportunity for extending the conversation.
HeinOnline  -- 33 Tex. Int'l L. J. 498 1998
